Abstract
This interpretative reasoning is traditionally called restrictive interpretation, or, more descriptively, restrictive interpretation in favour of state sovereignty.
2 It is almost always rejected by arbitrators or judges who are called upon to decide disputes. 3 This reasoning is sometimes referred to by means of Latin maxims, such as in dubio mitius, in dubio pro libertate, expressio unius esclusio alterius. 4 For instance, Jennings and Watts, in their edition of Oppenheim's International Law, labelled this rule under the maxim in dubio mitius. 5 Accordingly, an interpretative result -in this case an interpretation favourable to the freedom of states -is reached in one of two ways: by means of an explicit rule, such as the restrictive interpretation rule, or through the mere enunciation of a Latin phrase.
Today, with few exceptions, 6 the rule is always rejected in international decisions. 7 Nonetheless the maxims are still used to found an interpretation. 8 One of the aims of this article is to go back to the first formulations of a 'restrictive interpretation', and so to identify the exact content of this rule; a second aim is to show how the Latin maxims are (mis)used today and, finally, to call for a better understanding of treaty interpretation, especially of treaties regulating relations between states and private parties.
Restrictive Interpretation: Favourable and Odious Clauses
'Restrictive interpretation' is the interpretative choice which restricts the meaning of a text. In an original sense, it is restrictive in favour of the real intentions of the parties, Cf. infra sects. 3 and 4. 4 Kolb, 'Le maximes juridiques en droit international public: questions historiques et théoriques', 32 Rev Belge Droit Int 32 (1999) 407; id., 'La règle résiduelle de liberté en droit international public ("tout ce qui n'est pas interdit est permis")', 34 Rev Belge Droit Int (2001) 100; S. Sur, L'interprétation en droit international public (1974) , at 244. 5 as opposed to what is expressed in a text. 9 It was during the last two centuries that this expression became a value-oriented rule synonymous with interpretation in favour of state sovereignty. In the 17th and 18th centuries treaty interpretation was clearly not a neutral operation. Treaty interpretation was not organized in a set of rules, but it was not oriented in the same direction as in the last century: the interpretation was restricted in favour of different values, according to the maxim of the Glossators odia restringi et favores convenit ampliari. 10 Grotius, 11 Puffendorf, Textor, 12 and Wolff 13 all included this rule. Vattel gave the more articulated description of it.
14 This author dedicates paragraphs 299 to 309 of the second chapter of his Droit des Gens to things favourable and things odious: 15 §301. What tends to the common advantage, and to equality, is favourable; the contrary is odious. . . . §302. What is useful to human society, is favourable; the contrary is odious. . . .
§303. Whatever contains a penalty, is odious. . . . §304. Whatever renders a deed void is odious. . . . §305. Whatever tends to change the present state of things is odious; the opposite is favourable. . . . §306. Things of a mixed nature. Finally, there are things which are at once of a favourable or an odious nature, according to the point of view in which they are considered. 16 Then, in the last paragraph of that section, Vattel described how the 'favourable and odious clauses' have to be interpreted, that is, respectively, in an extensive and restrictive way. 17 In short, in the time of international law dominated by rationalist natural law what is now called the restrictive interpretation was not favourable to sovereignty; rather it was part of a reasoning which allowed for wider synthesis among the values that underlie (and are the aim) of international law. For instance, in Vattel's list, the common values and the purposes of international law were general utility, human sociality, freedom, the validity of the acts, the stability of a society. This comprehensive and wide conception could not withstand the impact of positivism however. Positivism is a catchall for many movements of thought and currents. The more relevant expression of this theory in international law is represented by the dualist voluntarism of Triepel and Anzilotti:
18 their vision of international law was characterized by a strong emphasis on the state, and accordingly, in treaty law, on the moment of the meeting of the states' wills, that is the moment of consent. 19 Under this conception, treaty interpretation evolved into a mere mechanical operation; restrictive interpretation remained a value-oriented rule, but no longer oriented towards principles and purposes common to every state, but towards sovereignties. 20 The rule did not change its deep structure (it remained the expression of the value-oriented rule) but rather the actual content, and it became a rough, quick manner of favouring the now unique value, that is the state. 
The Establishment of the Rule of the Restrictive Interpretation in Favour of State Sovereignty
This rule originated in a not so distant past when the concept of sovereignty was considered the basis both of the internal political organization of a state, and of international law. State sovereignty was the principle and the purpose of international law: ' Pillet, supra note 20, (1898) at 55-89, and (1899) 503-532.
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Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10, 4, at 18. This renowned dictum is emblematic of an age, and its relevance is not diminished by the fact that in this decision the majority was reached only with the vote of President Anzilotti: in fact, many dissenting opinions evidence that the disagreement did not relate to the content of the concept of sovereignty, but to other legal principles concurrent with it: dissenting opinion of Weiss, at 42-49 (especially at 43-44); Loder disagrees with the majority (at 34) but he describes the same strict construction of the rules affecting state sovereignty (at 35-36); see also the dissenting opinions of Niholm (59-61) and Altamira (96) (97) 35 In the same period, the same attitude can be found in arbitrations. In the De Pascale award of 1961, the tribunal said:
The international legal system is in favor of the freedom of the subjects involved. The principle of interpretation that preserves this freedom harmonizes with the prevailing tendency of international intercourse. There are many other examples, as in the Air Transport Services (France/USA) award. 37 The rule was applied also in few arbitrations between states and private parties, namely in the earliest decisions of the First Chamber of the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal; 38 nevertheless, the Tribunal soon ousted this rule, because of the continuous disequilibrium that it introduced in favour of one of the two parties (that is, the state).
The Rule Today A Disappearance from Theory
There are at least three characteristics of contemporary international law which contradict this interpretative rule, and which imply its extinction. The first was the changed political perspective. Faced with the totalitarian and authoritarian abuses of the state in the past century, a new substantive international law, and a new jurisdictional framework of supranational tribunals, emerged. Evidence of this change was the progressive affirmation of human rights, the emergence of international criminal law, the setting up of the WTO system, the widespread diffusion of bilateral investment treaties with compulsory arbitration clauses, and the erosion of the immunity of the state and of its representatives, as well as of the domestic jurisdiction of the state. The state was no longer perceived as a value, even divine, 39 as it was before, but a power to be limited, as in the more traditional liberal views.
The second is the contextual evolution of international law: its rules and its dispute settlement courts and tribunals were more and more dedicated to regulating not only relations among independent states but also private relations, among private parties as well as between states and private parties.
The third is the approval of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The absoluteness arising in recent centuries from the scientist thought declined on the state theory is echoed by H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer Reinen Rechtslehre (1920), at 21, n. 1: '[t]he almightiness of God in nature corresponds to the analogous almightiness of the state in the field of law. The theological and the corresponding legal dogma have the same sense. Just as the order of the world appears to the theologian as the will of God, the legal order appears to the legal theologian as the will of the state and this will can have any content whatsoever.
Neither from the notion of God nor from nature is there any restriction on the content of this will. The relationship between God and nature offers the same speculative possibilities as the relationship between the state and the law. Perfectly parallel are also the "God-Man" and "state-individual" relationships. The legal "theory" -without being aware of the fact -here runs mostly on already predisposed theological, but often also on mystic-logical patterns of thought' (my translation). at New York University on November 5, 2010
ejil.oxfordjournals.org
Downloaded from

Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s) 687
of the sovereignty-oriented restrictive rule. 41 It was during the 1950s that opinions against this rule came together in a harmonized voice. Fitzmaurice did not mention this rule in his influential essay on treaty interpretation published in the British Yearbook.
42
The Institut du Droit International, after a quick debate on the topic, 43 never envisaged it in its resolutions. 44 Furthermore Waldock never included this rule in his ILC reports on the law of the treaty. 45 In addition, no one contested this choice during the debates in the Commission and during the Vienna Conference on the law of treaties. In those debates, all claims for a strict interpretation of a text converged in the textual rule:
46 an explicit reference to the rule in favour of sovereignty was not necessary. In conclusion, the drafters of the Convention envisaged a set of rules based on the text; accordingly, the set of articles (31-33) dedicated to interpretation does not mention this rule.
B Disappearance from Practice
International decisions confirm the hypothesis envisaged in theory and by the Vienna Convention: the rule of restrictive interpretation in favour of state sovereignty is no longer in force. As far as disputes between states are concerned, a good example is the Iron Rhine arbitration, decided in 2005:
The doctrine of restrictive interpretation never had a hierarchical supremacy, but was a technique to ensure a proper balance of the distribution of rights within a treaty system. The principle of restrictive interpretation . . . is not in fact mentioned in the provisions of the Vienna Convention.
47
A few years later, in 2009, the ICJ pointed to the non-existence of this rule in the decision between Costa Rica and Nicaragua regarding navigational and related rights:
[T]he Court is not convinced . . . that Costa Rica's right of free navigation should be interpreted narrowly because it represents a limitation of the sovereignty over the river conferred by the Treaty on Nicaragua. 
A Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and the Reference to the Object and Purpose
The first place to investigate is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as an expression of contemporary customary international law on treaty interpretation. The reference to the 'object and purpose' contained in the first paragraph of Article 31 of the VCLT is interpreted by arbitrators and judges in two ways. According to the first, object and purpose, as a part of a single interpretive rule, are a useful measure by which to understand the precise meaning of an expression. 54 in the Courts of Strasbourg and San José, which justified it also by referring to the peculiar structure of the European and American conventions on human rights. 55 As far as investment arbitrations are concerned, 'an interpretation that looks at the treaty's object and purpose is particularly popular'. 56 In the Siemens case, for example, an arbitral tribunal strongly stressed the importance of the object and purpose contained in the Vienna Convention, and stressed also its incompatibility with restrictive interpretation:
The Tribunal considers that the Treaty has to be interpreted neither liberally nor restrictively, as neither of these adverbs is part of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. The Tribunal shall be guided by the purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title and preamble. 57 According to the second interpretation, the reference to the object and purpose of the Vienna Convention envisages an autonomous, specific rule to be applied when the ordinary meaning of an expression is not clear. For example, in Noble v. Romania an ICSID arbitral tribunal said:
The object and purpose rule also supports such an interpretation. While it is not permissible, as is too often done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of investors, here such an interpretation is justified.
58
B Effective Interpretation -Effet Utile
The same result is reached by means of so-called effective interpretation. This interpretive argument is not new: it was also present in international law before the approval of the Vienna Convention. The argument dictates that, as between an absurd meaning and a reasonable one, whoever interprets a treaty has to choose the latter. 59 of the more effective in relation to the object and purpose of a treaty. 60 The meaning of the effective interpretation rule is thus shifted today towards this object and purpose rule: it is not used in order to prefer a reasonable meaning over an absurd one, but to prefer the most effective one in relation to a purpose of the treaty. For example, in the United States -Sections 301-310 report a WTO Panel stated: DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.
61
C An Explicit Argument
A third way to apply the new interpretative value-oriented argument is by means of explicit reasoning, without any further reference to the Vienna Convention or to the principle of effectiveness. For example in the Tradex case, an ICSID Tribunal affirmed:
It would, therefore, seem appropriate to at least take into account, though not as a decisive factor by itself but rather as a confirming factor, that in case of doubt the 1993 Law should rather be interpreted in favour of investor protection and in favour of ICSID jurisdiction in particular. 62 Another body charged with adjudicating on disputes between individuals and states, the Inter American Commission, stated:
In relation to the argument made by the Chilean state . . . the Commission observes [that] in case of doubt, the ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the victims' rights. This principle of pro-homine, as the Inter-American Court has stated, is a controlling guideline for interpreting the Convention, and in human rights law in general. 63 Analogously, the Inter-American Court, in the 19 Tradesmen case, said: the right to due process must be considered in accordance with the object and purpose of the American Convention, which is the effective protection of the human being; in other words, it should be interpreted in favor of the individual, while the Spanish version even more clearly says ' 66 The interpretation obtained by the application of this principle is similar to that obtained by means of other, traditional Latin maxims, which will be considered in section 5.
D A New Rule
In conclusion, we see a new interpretative attitude emerging: in case of doubt, the interpretation more favourable to the private party must be preferred, and, moreover, in case of doubt the interpretation favourable to international jurisdiction and regulation against national ones must be preferred. It affects both the substantive content of the applicable law, and the level (international or national) entrusted to apply it.
New Rule, Old Descriptions
As in the past, the value-oriented interpretations mentioned above are also obtained by means of Latin maxims. The "advantage" of this technique is to lead to an interpretive result presenting it as a necessary one, and without giving reasons for its basis.
A Ut Res Magis Valeat quam Pereat
In the Iron Rhine arbitration the rule of more effective interpretation was justified by the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which would be better described by a new maxim ut res magis valeat:
Of particular importance is the principle of effectiveness: ut res magis valeant quam pereat. The relevance of effectiveness is in relation to the object and purpose of a treaty.
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The Tribunal places effective interpretation, object and purpose, and the maxim ut res magis valeat on the same level, using those terms as synonyms. 68 In drawing this parallel, the term of reference of the effectiveness is not the redundancy of a possible meaning (the Latin '. . . quam pereat'), but the object and purpose of a treaty: the best interpretation is the closest to the object and purpose of a treaty. Albanese, supra note 5, does not mention it. Roman law did not have the residual rule of individual freedom; it codified this idea in a set of maxims and presumptions in order to articulate and to simplify the process: Kolb, Les maximes, supra note 4, at 105-106. 67 Iron Rhine, supra note 47, at para. 49. 
B 'Exceptions to a Right must be Interpreted Narrowly' or 'Expressio Unius Esclusio Alterius'
This is not a new interpretative principle; it existed also in past international law. 69 However, in the old decisions this principle is strictly linked with the primacy of sovereignty (exceptions to the freedom of the states must be interpreted narrowly). 70 The rule is now used by the European Court of Human Rights about the limitations to the rights enshrined in the convention. 71 In its Report of 2 December 1996 a Panel established under the GATT affirmed that 'exceptions to obligations to trade liberalization must perforce be viewed with caution'. 78 All these passages, taken collectively, indicate a new way to conceive the 'general' and the 'special': in the past the 'general' was sovereignty and the 'exceptional' was derived from treaties. 79 Today the 'general' is the treaty, and the 'exceptional' is exceptions to the rights in the treaty.
This manner of interpreting a treaty can be described also by means of a Latin maxim. In the Suez-Inter Aguas case, Argentina proposed an extensive interpretation of the exceptions to the most favoured nation (MFN) clause envisaged by the BIT between Argentina and Spain, according to the maxim ejusdem generis. The Tribunal, on the contrary, held:
The Respondent further argues that this Tribunal should apply the principle of ejusdem generis in interpreting the Argentina-Spain BIT so as to exclude dispute settlement matters from the scope of the most-favored-nation clause, because the category 'dispute settlement' is not of the same genus as the matters addressed in the clause. The Tribunal finds no basis for applying the ejusdem generis principle to arrive at that result.
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The Tribunal, without giving any explanation, did not apply the maxim ejusdem generis (analogy) but strictly applied the hypothesis envisaged in a list (according to the maxim expressio unius esclusio alterius abovementioned) establishing its jurisdiction. Similarly, another ICSID Tribunal in the Tokio Tokelès case established its jurisdiction by affirming:
[T]he purpose of Article 1(2)(c) is only to extend the definition of 'investor' to entities established under the law of a third State provided certain conditions are met. Under the well established presumption expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the state of incorporation, not the nationality of the controlling shareholders or siège social, thus defines 'investors' of Lithuania under Article 1(2)(b) of the BIT.
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C The Opposite Argument: Ejusdem Generis (Analogy)
Nevertheless, when the extensive interpretation of a list would widen the scope of a treaty, the maxim ejusdem generis was preferred to that of expressio unius esclusio alterius. 82 In the Maffezini case an ICSID arbitral tribunal was again faced with the interpretation of an MFN clause. The question was how one should interpret the list of the cases to which the MFN clause is extended. The arbitrators concluded:
[I]f a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protection of the investor's rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle. 83 However, as in the cases seen in the preceding paragraph, the arbitral tribunal did not explain the reason for the choice of one Latin maxim in lieu of its opposite.
D On the Latin Maxims
The Latin maxims, behind the seeming neutrality of their formulation, are a means of applying a substantive choice and, at the same time, hiding it. By using Latin maxims, he who decides a dispute is not justifying a choice, but simply describing the way an argument is developed. The maxims indicate how one should reach a certain result; they do not indicate why one should do so. They accomplish implicitly what the value-oriented rule does explicitly. In the past, (i) 'sovereignty' and 'state', (ii) the restrictive interpretation, and (iii) Latin maxims were (i) concepts, (ii) rules, and (iii) techniques (or, rather, descriptions) used interchangeably, sometimes alone and sometimes at the same time, in order to obtain a decision which was less onerous for a state. The relevant triad has now become (i) international jurisdiction and regulation, (ii) effective interpretation/object and purpose rule/pro private principle, and (iii) Latin maxims.
The Emergence of a Short Circuit
A presumption of the past, that in cases of doubt the meaning which impaired state sovereignty the least had to be preferred, is now reversed; in cases of doubt the meaning which impairs state sovereignty the most is to be preferred. Nevertheless, this new rule gives rise to some questions. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that the preference against the state can be accepted in human rights jurisdiction on the basis of equity 84 in favour of the weak party -the person -as Professor Scovazzi maintains, 85 it is less clear that the same preference should favour big corporations. Thus, although an interpretation in favour of the private party in one case may be equitable, in the second case the same could be inequitable. This problem emerged in explicit terms in the Saluka case:
The 'object and purpose' of the Treaty may be discerned from its title and preamble. These read: 'Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments'. . . The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying the parties' This Tribunal considers that a balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignty and the State's responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow. 87 These decisions raise urgent and concrete questions, and they warn us of the temptation to reduce and oversimplify an interpretation. These decisions call for a wider vision of international law, neither servilely obedient to, and fragmented in, sovereignties, nor servilely obedient to, and fragmented in, each object and purpose, but open to a more complete and integrated reasoning. However, the quoted proposals refer to criteria ('encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying the parties' economic relations'; 'creat[ing] an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of economic activities') which are difficult to determine, and above all difficult to determine for such a limited institutional body as an arbitral tribunal; 88 the modern state, in order to deal with these uneasy duties -to encourage investments, to extend parties' relations, to create a framework for development -structured an organic system of check and balances, and opposite powers. 89 It is arguable that an international tribunal is the best place systematically to conduct these operations of synthesis.
Some Hints from Strasbourg to Washington
Considering another Court dedicated to adjudicating private-state disputes, the Strasbourg Court, certain useful hints emerge on this issue. In the period between the fall of the interpretative rule favourable to state sovereignty and the rise of the opposite rule, a new argument favourable to the state was applied by the Strasbourg Court: the 'margin of appreciation'. A reference to this concept was already made in one of the The complexity of the 'investment' notion in the ICSID convention is analysed in Seatzu, 'La nozione di "investimento internazionale" nella convenzione di Washington del 1965 sulla soluzione delle controversie tra stati e nazionali di altri stati alla luce di una recente giurisprudenza arbitrale', in G. This being so, and having regard to the high responsibility which a Government has to its people to protect them against any threat to the life of the nation, it is evident that a certain discretion -a certain margin of appreciation -must be left to the Government in determining whether there exists a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and which must be dealt with by exceptional measures derogating from its normal obligations under the Convention. 91 The Court also refers to the margin of appreciation. 92 There is no unique vision of the margin of appreciation: scholars are divided about it, describing it as a doctrine, 93 a technique, 94 or a rhetorical argument; 95 they criticize it as such, because it is vague, not precise, it does not introduce more predictability, 96 it is an old concept no longer valid, 97 or they criticize the use of it by the Strasbourg Court. 98 On the one hand certain scholars maintain that the margin is one face of a relativistic conception of the human rights system; on the other hand, some others attribute to the margin the function of stopping an imperial and universalistic application of human rights. 99 Thus, the functioning of the margin in the Strasbourg Court's decisions, 'margin' is literally a space, a space dividing subjects pertaining to different systems. It is not a substantive principle (like sovereignty), but it reflects the tolerance, the space, the degree of freedom between different systems: in other words we can also say that the margin concerns an area common to different legal systems equally competent and responsible to deal with it.
Concluding Remarks
An historical survey of the so-called rule of restrictive interpretation in favour of state sovereignty shows us that this expression is a contingent label given to a wider rule, the value-oriented rule. A value-oriented approach to treaty interpretation is not new, but in the past it was explicitly admitted, and not hidden within value-neutral statements. 108 Thus, one of the purposes of this article is to display these values; a second purpose is to shed light on the rhetorical use of the Latin maxims which are used in a way which is supposedly objective, while in reality biased.
Once it is affirmed that interpretation is not a disinterested application of rules, but a legal operation rooted in an historical context, this survey allows us again to comprehend the actual role of treaty interpretation in recent decades, and today. A firmly value-oriented interpretation can be accepted, tolerated, and justified in specifically defined phases in order to aid a new political consensus which encompasses a broader conception of human society, against an old status quo which failed to consider an important part of it. During the age of restrictive interpretation in favour of sovereignty, international law insisted on a state-centred vision which failed conceptually to retain a residual place in the global order for individuals and international law. After a nationalistic age, an interpretation in favour of international law was desired and welcomed because it was generally perceived as an aid in establishing an international legal order, in breaking through the crusts built around the states by the previous idealistic-hegelian nationalist extremes. 109 We find ourselves now in a pro-international interpretation phase or, better, in a phase of interpretation against the state. This opens two questions.
First, after an idealistic-hegelian world fragmented into sovereignties, we are now in a still idealistic-hegelian world, fragmented into many external targets to be reached by means of a treaty. The problem is that these targets, the objects and purposes of the treaties, interpreted according to a maximum standard of the 'promotion argument' dedicated to regulating the relations between a state and its individuals, and by private party-state litigation, to place strong emphasis on the rights of individuals contained in an international agreement or on sovereignty implies necessarily to unbalance an interpretation in favour of one or the other party to a dispute. I aim neither to return to an age of the predominance of sovereignty, nor to persist in irreconcilable global regimes. I would preserve and better describe the complexity of the global legal order. This is possible only according to a subsidiarian view of the relationships between the different layers -or more precisely, orders -which compose it (international, of the state, and of society). In a fair international law equal citizenship to international governance, local political organization, and individual and social freedoms must be assured. They may play and interact on the same level. The law acts between them: it must preserve a space of freedom -a margin -where these actors, freely expressing themselves according to their desires, can live together in, and shape, a global, interconnected world.
Accordingly, treaty interpretation must reflect these equal positions and the need for this space, so that who interprets, acting in concrete situations as an independent corrective to possible abuses, and not as a partisan agent of one of the parties, should recognize which actor is better placed to define -in this space -extreme cases.
